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AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF NOW LEGAL DEFENSE
AND EDUCATION FUND AND EQUAL RIGHTS
ADVOCATES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT AND IN SUPPORT OF REVERSAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
LUCAS ROSA
V.
PARK WEST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTSt
Ktherine cM. 'Franke
t In publishing this brief, the Michigan Journal of Gender &Law has made no editorial
changes other than correcting any spelling errors and changing citation form to con-
form with the Bluebook 17th edition.
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER &r LAW
I. IDENTITY OF THE AmIci
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund ("NOW LDEF") is a
leading national non-profit civil rights organization that performs a
broad range of legal and educational services in support of efforts to
eliminate sex-based discrimination" and secure equal rights. NOW
LDEF was founded in 1970 by leaders of the National Organization for
Women as a separate organization. NOW LDEF has appeared as ami-
cus in numerous cases involving sex stereotyping as a form of sex
discrimination, including Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,' and Fisher v.
Vassar College.2
Equal Rights Advocates ("ERA") is one of the oldest public interest
law firms specializing in educational and litigation efforts to eliminate
gender discrimination and secure equal rights. Begun in 1974 as a
teaching law firm focused on sex-based discrimination, ERA has evolved
into a legal organization with a multi-faceted approach to addressing
issues of gender discrimination. Its current work includes impact litiga-
tion, advice and counseling, public education, and public policy
initiatives. ERA's interest in this case is based on the organization's
commitment to fighting discrimination on the basis of sex stereotyping.
ERA's amicus work in the area of sex stereotyping discrimination in-
cludes Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,3 and Fisher v. Vassar College.4
II. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
By dismissing the plaintiffs complaint under the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act ("ECOA") on the ground that "the issue in this case is
not [Rosa's] sex, but rather how he chose to dress when applying for a
loan" (Bench Order at 1), the lower court erroneously established that
there are no set of facts in which clothing-based sex stereotyping can
form the basis of a legitimate claim of sex discrimination in access to
credit. This view of the meaning and scope of the ECOA runs contrary
to well-established Supreme Court precedent which prohibits, inter alia,
the adverse treatment of a man or a woman for his or her failure to
1. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
2. Fisher v. Vassar Coil., 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1075
(1998).
3. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 228.
4. Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1332.
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conform to traditional sex stereotypes-whether it be the expectation
that men should be breadwinners, or that women should be feminine.5
Further, to rule, as did the lower court, that stereotypes associated
with proper "men's" and "women's" clothing is a matter separate and
apart from sex discrimination, is to ignore the significant role that dress
reform has played in efforts to achieve gender equality for women-
from rejecting the wearing of corsets to demands to be permitted to
wear trousers in the workplace. Further, the lower court's ruling denies a
large body of psychological research that demonstrates the cognitive role
that clothing plays in the use of sex stereotypes in the workplace and
other market settings.
Thus, the lower court erred in holding, as a matter of law, that
there can be no relation between clothing-based sex stereotypes and sex
discrimination under the ECOA.
III. ARGU NT
A. The District Court Erred in Rejecting Plaintiffs
Claim ofSex-Based Disparate Treatment
The trial court in the instant case dismissed the plaintiffs claim of
sex discrimination in access to credit on the ground that "the issue in
this case is not [Rosa's] sex, but rather how he chose to dress when ap-
plying for a loan." (Bench order at 1.) Yet time and again the Supreme
Court has interpreted sex discrimination prohibitions to apply to men
and women who do not conform to traditional norms with respect to
how the different sexes are "supposed to" look or behave. In case after
case the Court has held that federal law prohibits disparate treatment of
men or women on the basis of stereotypic assumptions about who is or
should be the breadwinner in the family, who is or should be the pri-
mary caretaker for children, and how a person should dress in
conformance with gender norms that dictate feminine dress for women
and masculine dress for men. The Supreme Court's ruling in Price Wa-
terhouse v. Hopkins,6 represents the culmination of a long line of
5. See e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 228 (employer may not refuse partnership to a
woman who was considered to be too masculine); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636 (1975) (improper to set award of public benefits on the automatic pre-
sumption that wives are economically dependent upon their husbands, and husbands
are not so dependent upon their wives).
6. Price Waternouse, 490 U.S. at 228.
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Supreme Court cases in which principles of sex discrimination were
grounded in a prohibition against sex stereotyping.
The Supreme Court's sex equality jurisprudence has progressed
through a number of stages. Initially, the Court sanctioned the separate
spheres doctrine, turning away challenges to state laws that prohibited
women from practicing law,7 and denying them licenses to serve alcohol
unless they were employed by their husbands or fathers.8 In the 1970s
the Court began to take a different tack in its approach to sex discrimi-
nation claims. Having previously endorsed policies grounded in sexual
stereotypes regarding the proper roles, abilities and positions of women
and men in the home and in public, in 1973 the Court began to ques-
don the legitimacy of these same stereotypes. Numerous cases
established the Court's view that the legal wrong of sex discrimination
lay in the problem of the illegitimacy of decisions based upon gender
9
stereotypes.
In these cases, the Court established a rule that it was unfair to
judge the qualifications, merits or traits of an individual based upon
7. See Bradwellv. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
8. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
9. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979) (reasoning that maternal
and paternal roles are not invariably different in importance and holding that the
Equal Protection Clause was violated by the sex-based distinction between unmarried
mothers and unmarried fathers in New York domestic relations law); Orr v. Orr, 440
U.S. 268, 279 (1979) (holding that gender-based alimony statute violated equal
protection and could not be validated on basis of state's preference for allocation of
family responsibilities in which wife plays a dependent role); Califano v. Goldfarb,
430 U.S. 199, 217 (1977) (holding that Social Security Act's gender-based distinc-
tion between widows and widowers violated due process and equal protection and
discriminated against covered female wage earners); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S.
498, 507 (1975) (disparate treatment of men and women in Naval promotion sched-
ules does not reflect "archaic and overbroad generalizations" about the relative
abilities of men and women); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 17 (1975) (statutory
distinction between males and females, which resulted in appellee's liability for child
support for a daughter only to age 18 but for a son to age 21, found unconstitu-
tional); Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 645 (Social Security Act provision that granted
survivors' benefits to widows, but not widowers, was grounded in the impermissible
gender-based generalization that men are more likely than women to be the primary
supporters of their spouses and children); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 352 (1974)
(challenge to Florida statute giving widows but not widowers a $500 exemption from
property taxation); Froniero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973) (striking
down statutes that granted automatic presumption that wives of male uniformed
service members were economically dependent upon their husbands for purposes of
obtaining increased quarters allowances and medical, and dental benefits, but that
spouses of female members were not so dependent); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77
(1971) (invalidating Idaho probate statute which granted preference to males over
equally qualified females in the administration of estates).
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gross generalizations or stereotypes about the class-male or female-to
which that person belonged. This was the case even if the application of
those generalizations might hold true for some or many members of the
class, and the use of the generalization was, therefore, a relatively effi-
cient or administratively convenient way of allocating resources, or
resolving disputes.'0 According to the Court, the abilities and needs of
each person must be assessed on an individualized basis, not by resort to
group-based generalizations or stereotypes.
Most interesting, for present purposes, is the fact that a great many
of the cases through which the Supreme Court chose to develop its
modern sex discrimination jurisprudence involved claims in which men
were the victims of sex-based stereotypic thinking. Thus, in Wein-
berger,1 the Court invalidated a federal Social Security death benefit
policy that paid benefits only to surviving widows/mothers, but not to
widowers/fathers, on the grounds that the gender-based classification
illegitimately frustrated the desires of fathers, such as Stephen Wiesen-
feld, to stay home and care for their dependent children since
[i]t is no less important for a child to be cared for by its sole
surviving parent when that parent is male rather than female.
And a father, no less than a mother, has a constitutionally
protected right to the "companionship, care, custody, and
management" of "the children he has sired and raised"...
The Court applied similar reasoning in Califano,3 when a wid-
ower challenged a Social Security rule that extended survivors' benefits
to widows but not widowers on the assumption that widowers, as a rule,
were not likely to have been dependent upon their wives, whereas it was
fair to assume that widows have been so dependent upon their former
husbands. The statute was held unconstitutional because it was
"supported by no more substantial justification than 'archaic and over-
broad' generalizations ... or 'old notions,' ... such as 'assumptions as
10. See City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708
(1978) ("Even a true generalization about the class is an insufficient reason for dis-
qualifying an individual to whom the generalization does not apply."); Reed, 404 U.S.
at 76 ("To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the
other, merely [on the grounds of administrative convenience] is to make the very
kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause . .
11. Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 652-53.
12. Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 652.
13. Califano, 430 U.S. at 199-206.
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to dependency,' .. that are more consistent with 'the role-typing soci-
ety has long imposed...." 4
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan15 represented the culmi-
nation of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of sex equality articulated
through claims brought by men. In Hogan, the Court struck down the
admissions policies of a state-run nursing school that refused to admit
men on the ground that such a policy perpetuates "the stereotyped view
of nursing as an exclusively woman's job."
6
The Supreme Court treated each of these cases in which male
plaintiffs successfully challenged policies that discriminated against
them on the basis of their non-conformance with gender stereotypes,
not as strange outliers that pushed the boundaries of the sex equality
norm, but rather as central cases in which the Court articulated its core
commitments to sex-based equality. "The fact that the classification ex-
pressly discriminates against men rather than women does not protect it
from scrutiny."
17
What is more, the normative force of these cases lay in the manner
in which the policies at issue punished men who chose to defy larger
cultural expectations with respect to parenting responsibilities. Indeed,
in Orr, Justice Brennan was troubled by a rule that failed to recognize
"family units [that] defied the stereotype and left the husband depend-
ent on the wife." 9
The Supreme Court's modern sex discrimination jurisprudence has
primarily taken aim at two forms of sex stereotyping: policies and prac-
tices that reward conformance to certain over-broad and unfounded
class-based assumptions about the relative strengths and weaknesses of
men and women, and policies and practices that punish men and
women for their failure to conform to stereotypic expectations about
who men and women are or should be. Thus, by 1978 the Court was
comfortable concluding that "[ilt is now well recognized that employ-
14. Califano, 430 U.S. at 207 (citations omitted). See also Wengler v. Druggists Mutual
Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 152 (1980) (Missouri workers' compensation death benefit
paid to widows but not widowers held to discriminate on the basis of sex).
15. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
16. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 729.
17. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1978) (citations omitted). "[G]ender-based discrimi-
nations against men have been invalidated when they do not 'serve important
governmental objectives and (arc not) substantially related to the achievement of
those objectives.'" Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 209 n.8 (citations omitted).
18. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389 (1978); Weinberger v. Wiesen-
feld, 420 U.S. 636, 652 (1974). Regarding who should be the "breadwinner" in the
family, see, e.g., Orr, 440 U.S. at 282-84; Califano, 430 U.S. at 199.
19. Orr, 440 U.S. at 282.
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ment decisions cannot be predicated on mere 'stereotyped' impressions
about the characteristics of males or females."2°
The Court's stereotyping jurisprudence reached its most mature
stage in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,21 in which Ann Hopkins was de-
nied partnership at a prominent accounting firm because the firm's
male partners considered her to be too masculine. In fact, Price Water-
house's partners placed Hopkins in an impossible double bind: "[ain
employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose positions
require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible
catch 22.' 22 Thus the Court held that "[i]n the specific context of sex
stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman
cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of
gender."2' Here, as in the Court's earlier sex discrimination cases, sex
stereotyping lay at the core of the discriminatory wrong: "we are beyond
the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or
insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their
group....
In light of this well-established precedent, the trial court's holding
in this case fails to appreciate the nature of the wrong of sex discrimina-
tion as articulated by the Supreme Court over the last three decades.
Rosa's claim that he was discriminated against on the basis of his sex
when he was refused a loan application by defendant Park West Bank
raises an issue of sex-based disparate treatment no less central to anti-
discrimination law than that raised by Joseph Frontiero and Leon
Goldfarb, men who were economically dependent upon their wives;
Stephen Wiesenfeld, a man who wanted to be the primary caretaker for
his children; Joe Hogan, a man who wanted to be a nurse; or Ann Hop-
kins, a woman who was told she should "walk more femininely, talk
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair
styled, and wear jewelry." 2 In essence, Mr. Rosa was told that he would
be given a loan application from Park West Bank if, and only if, he
would walk more masculinely, dress more masculinely, remove his
makeup, have his hair cut, and wear no jewelry. In other words, if he
20. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978).
21. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
22. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.
23. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250.
24. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.
25. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235 (internal quotations omitted).
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conformed to traditional stereotypes about what a man is supposed to
look like and how he is supposed to behave.26
Indeed, it is well-settled in the First Circuit that prohibitions
against sex discrimination include improper sex stereotyping. In Higgins
v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc. ,27 Judge Selya wrote that, "just as a
woman can ground an action on a claim that men discriminated against
her because she did not meet stereotyped expectations of femininity,28 a
man can ground a claim on evidence that other men discriminated
against him because he did not meet stereotyped expectations of mascu-
linity.
29
For a man to be denied access to credit on the basis of traits that
would have been welcome if found in a woman is sex discrimination,
plain and simple. Judge Freedman's ruling below i) that "the issue in
this case is not his sex," (Bench Order at I), and ii) that there is no set of
facts upon which the gender non-conformance of a man might consti-
tute sex discrimination, ignores the Supreme Court's and First Circuit's
repeated insistence that sex discrimination laws are designed to "'strike
at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women re-
sulting from sex stereotypes."' 0 Whatever its ultimate strength on the
facts, this claim is not amenable to dismissal as a matter of law on a
12(b)(6) motion.
26. See Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender From Sex and Sexual Orientation: The
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 Yja L.J. 1, 47 (1995).
See also Flynn v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 91 Civ. 0035 (KMW), 1993 WL
336957, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 1993) (defendant's summary judgment motion de-
nied where female plaintiff who had been demoted and then terminated from
employment "has produced sufficient evidence for a rational factfnder to infer that
Scott's rejection of plaintiff was motivated by a male coworker's belief that plaintiff
was too aggressive.").
27. 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999).
28. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250-51.
29. Higgins, 194 F.3d at 261 n.4. See also Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of
Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1,
96 (1995) ("If a woman cannot be punished or harassed for failing to demonstrate
her femininity in accordance with some acceptable norm, then the same can and
must be said about men and masculinity.")
30. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251, (citing Manhart, 435 U.S. at 707 (quoting Sprogis
v. UnitedAir Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cit. 1971))). See also Thomas v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 59 (1st Cir. 1999).
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B. There Is a Close Relationship Between Clothing
and Sex Discrimination
As amici have shown above, Rosa has stated a claim of sex dis-
crimination that comfortably fits within the Supreme Court's sex-
stereotyping jurisprudence. In addition, the District Court's holding
that the ECOA "does not prohibit discrimination based on the manner
in which someone dresses," (Bench Order at 1-2), ignores both the role
of dress reform in the history of struggles for women's equality, as well
as social science research documenting the close link between clothing
and sex stereotypes.
1. Clothing Has Always Played a Role In
Struggles For Women's Equality
Laws requiring women and men to wear particular clothing, or
prohibiting men and women from wearing the "wrong" clothing, find
their origins in Elizabethan sumptuary laws, 31 and were reflected in the
first sets of laws enacted by early settlers in North America. Indeed, the
governors of the Massachusetts Bay colony considered it essential to the
public order that colonists' dress be strictly regulated, and a Boston
judge held in 1638 that "the elders' wives were themselves party to the
general disorder of apparel."
32
The reform of gendered clothing norms has always figured cen-
trally in movements for women's equality in the United States.
Antebellum feminists explicitly and consistently connected demands for
women's equality to reform of oppressive clothing norms for women.
31. See ALAN HUNT, GOVERNANCE OF THE CONSUMING PAssIoN: A HISTORY OF SuMP-
TUARY LAw 17-41(1996). Hunt convincingly demonstrates that laws regulating
clothing have always been based in status distinctions. Originally adopted as a means
of enforcing social and economic class-based distinctions by prohibiting one from
"dressing above one's rank," id. at 39, toward the end of the thirteenth century the
law began to enforce sharp sexual distinctions in clothes. Id. at 217.
32. DAVID FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEw ENGLAND 185 (1972); NATHANIEL
SHURTLEFF, THE RECORDS oF Tim GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE MASACHU-
sETTs BAY COMPANY [1853] (1968); ALAN HUNT, GOVERNANCE OF THE CONSUMING
PASSIONS: A HISTORY OF SUMPTuARY LAw 38-39 (1996).
33. See, e.g., SARAH M. GruMK, LErERS ON EQUALTY OF THE SEaXs, AND THE CONDI-
TION OF WOMAN (1838) (Characterizing women's clothing as "absurd" and
"degrading," commentators in the 1850's observed that "your dress movement in-
volves the whole Woman's Rights Cause.") Gerrit Smith, THE SIBYL: A REVIEW OF
THE TASTES, ERRORS, AND FASHIONS OF SocmT, DEVOTED To DRESS REFORM 178
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In the 1890s a group of women in Massachusetts interested in ad-
vancing dress reform formed an organization called the Dress Reform
Club of Boston, and staged various public demonstrations to illustrate
the need for more practical clothing for women.Y The significance of
clothing reform to women has persisted in 20th Century struggles for
women's equality in challenges to workplace rules that prohibited
women from wearing pants,35 forced them to wear sexually suggestive
attire,M or demanded that they wear high heels.37
Thus, the District Court's order, severing clothing norms from the
subject of sex discrimination, denies a history in which dress reform has
played a key role in the struggles for women's equality.
2. Psychological Research Has Demon-
strated a Clear Link Between Clothing
and Gender Stereotypes
Quite frequently, courts have turned to social science research in
order to identify exactly the nature and scope of the "entire spectrum"
of sex-stereotyping." For present purposes, ample psychological research
has documented the manner in which masculine clothing communi-
cates competence; femininity communicates incompetence; men have
less freedom than women to dress in gender non-conforming ways; and
men who do not wear "appropriately masculine" attire suffer consider-
able discrimination in a spectrum of settings. All of this research
demonstrates the manner in which gendered clothing norms reflect and
perpetuate sex-stereotyping of the type proscribed by federal sex dis-
(June 1, 1857); Robert E. Riegel, Women's Clothes and Women' Rights, 15 Am. Q.
390, 390 (1963).
34. See Riegel, supra note 33, at 398.
35. See Lanigan v. Bartlett and Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
36. See EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Priest v. Rotary,
624 F. Supp. 571, 581 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
37. See, e.g., Marc Linder, Smart Women, Stupid Shoes, and Cynical Employers: The Un-
lawfulness and Adverse Health Consequences of Sexually Discriminatoy Workplace
Footwear Requirementsfr Femak Employees, 22 J. CoRp. L. 295 (1997).
38. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989); Harper v. South-
east Alabama Med. Ctr., 998 F. Supp. 1289, 1296-97 (M.D. Ala. 1998); Butler v.
Home Depot, 984 F. Supp. 1257, 1259 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Mann v. Montgomery,
No. 84 C 11020, 1994 WL 383905, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 19, 1994); Robinson v.
Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1257, 1486, 1502-09 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Na-
menwirth v. Bd. of Regents, 769 F.2d 1235, 1239 n.2 (7th Cir. 1985).
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crimination laws, and recognized by the Supreme Court in Price Water-
house.39
Current research by cognitive psychologists is helpful in illumi-
nating the ways in which gender-based stereotypes are activated
immediately upon meeting a person, through a process termed "implicit
stereotyping." 0 These seemingly automatic cognitive shortcuts allow us
to perceive other people by grouping them into preexisting social cate-
gories-by sex, race, or age for instance-and, then treating category
members alike, thus "avoid[ing] the effort involved in perceiving each
person as a wholly new stimulus about whom they know nothing.""
"Implicit stereotyping" allows us to engage in this kind of category-
based perception by applying, inter alia, gender-based schemas to the
interpretation of other people's behavior or physical demeanor. We use
these gender-based schemas unless there is some reason to believe oth-
erwise: people act "as if the burden of proof lies on showing that the
[gender] characteristics are not relevant to their task."42
Thus, these cognitive short cuts operate as a kind of "labor-saving
device,"43 that both reflect and perpetuate gender stereotypes particularly
where, as here, the parties' encounter is both short and relatively super-
ficial.
There are particular dangers at risk when gender-based schemas are
used to determine loan-worthiness, managerial abilities, or other
business-related criteria in the workplace and financial or other market-
based contexts. This is the case because masculinity and femininity are
not regarded as symmetrical social statuses. To be interpreted according
to a masculine schema is to be attributed a higher status than if one
were assigned the traits associated with feminine schema. Masculinity
typically denotes dominance, autonomy, aggressiveness, competence,
objectivity, competitiveness, dependability and leadership, whereas
femininity typically translates as deference, nurturance, passivity,
39. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250-52.
40. See generally Mahzarin Banaji & Curtis D. Hardin, Automatic Stereotyping, 7 Psy-
CHOL. Sci. 136 (1996); Mahzarin R. Banaji, Curtis D. Hardin & Alexander J.
Rothman, Implicit Stereotping in Personal Judgement, 65 J. oF PERSONAITY AND
SoC. PsYcHOL. 272 (1993).
41. Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske, Gender, Power Dynamics, and Social Interaction, in
REVISIONING GENDER 365, 371 (Myra Marx Ferree, Judith Lorber & Beth B. Hess
eds., 1999).
42. Joseph Berger, D.G. Wagner & Morris Zelditch, Introduction: Expectation States
Theory: Review and Assessment, in STATus, REWARDS, AND INFLUENCE: How ExPEC-
TATIONS ORGANIZE BEHAVIOR (Joseph Berger & Morris Zelditch, Jr., eds., 1985).
43. See Glick & Fiske, Gender, Power Dynamics, and Social Interaction, supra note 41, at
371.
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cooperativeness and incompetence." Thus, as cognitive psychologists
have found, those people who are "read" as feminine are treated as lower
status, while those people "read" as masculine are treated as higher
45
status.
These "facts" of social cognition have been born out in a number
of different contexts, and have formed the basis of more complex studies
of the ways in which asymmetrical gender norms operate in market-
based interactions. For instance, banking executives and marketing
managers were shown to perceive applicants for management positions
as more forceful, aggressive, dynamic, and decisive in direct proportion
to how masculinely the applicant dressed. This was true regardless of the
sex of the interviewer. Similarly, in Gender Trials, Jennifer L. Pierce un-
dertook an in-depth study of the ways in which gender stereotypes work
in large law firms. She found that masculine behavior, understood as
aggressiveness, adversarialness, machoness, dominance, and "Rambo"
litigation style was rewarded in both male and female attorneys, and
that those who exhibited feminine behavior enjoyed lower status and
positions within most firms.47 Indeed, those men who failed to "do
dominance" according to the gender-based expectations at work in the
firms were feminized in the process, 48 and thereby enjoyed lower status
in their firm.
In roughly twenty-five years, many workplaces and other market
contexts have evolved in the enforcement of gender norms from regimes
that required women to wear dresses, to laws making it illegal to refuse
to permit an employee to wear pants.49 As women have entered the wage
labor market in greater numbers, they have been encouraged to present
themselves in more masculine demeanor, given that competence and
44. See, e.g., Deborah L. Best and John E. Williams, A Cross-Cultural Viewpoint, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF GENDER 215 (Anne E. Beall & Robert J. Sternberg, eds., 1993);
Virginia Ellen Schein, The Relationship Between Sex Role Stereotypes and Requisite
Management Characteristics, 57 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 95, 98 (1973).
45. See, e.g., Michael Conway, et al., Status, Communality, and Agency: Implications for
Stereotypes of Gender and Other Groups, 71 J. OF PERSONALITY AND Soc. PSYCHOL. 25
(1996).
46. Sandra M. Forsythe, Effect ofApplicant's Clothing on Interviewer's Decision to Hire, 20
J. OF APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL 1579 (1990).
47. See JENNIFER L. PIERCE, GENDER TRIALS 50-82 (1995).
48. PIERCE, supra note 47, at 52.
49. Compare Lanigan v. Bartlett and Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388 (W.D. Mo. 1979)
(employer permitted to refuse women the right to wear pants in the workplace) with
CAL. GovT CODE § 12947.5 (West 1994) ("[ult shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to refuse to permit an employee to wear pants on account of
the sex of the employee.").
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success are defined in masculine terms.50 Indeed, these principles have
been brought into the courtroom as well-surely a domain that de-
mands decorum, professionalism and appropriate attire of the counsel
who appear therein.51
Thus, robust enforcement of sex discrimination laws in various as-
pects of public life have afforded women a broader range of acceptable
attire. A case filed today similar to Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain,52 in
which a female employee was fired for wearing pants to work, would
surely be viewed by almost any court as presenting an easy case of sex
discrimination. Yet men have not similarly benefitted from the victories
of sex discrimination litigation over the last quarter century. While it is
acceptable for women to perform what has been traditionally regarded
as men's work (e.g., practicing medicine or law) as well as women's
work (e.g., nursing or childcare), and women have the option of dress-
ing in more feminine or masculine clothing, men continue to confront
rigid gender norms that form the basis of chastisement or disapproba-
tion when they perform women's work or dress in more feminine
53manners.
Again, the social science literature has documented an asymmetry
in the ways gender norms are enforced against women and men. Saul
Feinman has shown how and why boys who perform cross-sex-role be-
havior receive more disapproval than do girls. 5' First, his results indicate
that boys pay a much higher price when they act "like girls," than do
girls when they act "like boys"; "it is worse to be a sissy than a tom-
boy. 55 But he also found that "male-role behavior is more highly
approved than female-role behavior for male and female actors." 56 His
findings revealed that when females acted femininely they were regarded
50. Yet, there is a limit to the extent to which decision-makers will tolerate masculinity in
women. Ann Hopkins encountered that limit. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228 (1989).
51. See In re De Carlo, 357 A.2d 273, 274-75 (1976) (reversal of contempt order issued
against female attorney who appeared in court in slacks [and a sweater]); NYCLA
Eth. Op. 688, 1991 WiL 755944, at *3 (N.Y. Cty. Law. Assn. Comm. Prof. Eth.)
("The Code of Professional Responsibility does not prohibit a female lawyer from
wearing appropriately tailored pant suits or other pant-based outfits in a court ap-
pearance").
52. Lanigan, 466 F. Supp. at 1388.
53. See, e.g., Susan Hesselbart, Women Doctors Win and Male Nurses Lose: A Study of Sex
Role and Occupational Stereotypes, 4 Soc. oF WORK AND OCCUPATIONs 49 (1977).
54. See Saul Feinman, Why Is Cross-Sex-Role Behavior More Approved for Girls than for
Boys?A Status Characteristic Approach, 7 SEx RoLEs 289 (1981).
55. Fineman, supra note 54, at 297.
56. Fineman, supra note 54, at 297.
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as enacting female-role behavior, and when they acted masculinely they
were seen as enactingperson-role behavior. However, for males, perform-
ance of masculine behavior satisfied the person-role and the male-role,
yet the performance of feminine behavior satisfied no role behavior ex-
pectations.57 In other words, masculine-behaving females were
understood to be acting like a person, and feminine-behaving males
were understood to be strange.
Thus, Judge Freedman's characterization of Rosa's complaint as
having nothing to do with sex discrimination, but merely addressing
"discrimination on the basis of the manner in which someone dresses,"
(Bench Order at 1-2), is to overlook, if not to deny, the cultural signifi-
cance of the clothes Rosa was wearing when he was summarily rejected
for a loan application. The notion that there is proper men's clothing
and proper women's clothing is, without question, grounded in cultural
gender norms.58 These norms operate differently for men than they do
for women, in so far as women are given greater latitude to dress in ei-
ther masculine or feminine attire, and femininity has been shown to
represent lower status and lower competence. As such, this Court
should reject an interpretation of the ECOA that denies any connection
between sex discrimination, gender norms and clothing. If Judge
Freedman were correct that distinctions based upon clothing or other
attire are irrelevant to sex discrimination prohibitions, then a loan offi-
cer would be free to deny a loan to a woman because she looked too
"frilly," on the assumption that women who dress in an extremely femi-
nine manner most likely have not had experience managing financial
matters, or to prefer extending credit to men who wear masculine busi-
ness attire, since that business attire might indicate greater experience
handling financial affairs. In either of these cases, the loan officer would
be making credit-worthiness determinations based on gendered stereo-
types, the precise evil the ECOA was enacted to prevent.
57. See Fineman, supra note 54, at 297.
58. See Franke, supra note 29, at 58-69.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should determine that the
plaintiff has stated a valid claim of sex discrimination under the ECOA
and remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings.
Date: February 3, 2000
